ENDNOTES

1. A definition of "development effectiveness" is not commonly agreed upon by various stakeholders such as the World Bank, OECD DAC, CSOs, etc. In 2015, the NDG identified four possible categories for the term: organizational effectiveness, coherence, outcomes from aid, and overall development outcomes. These categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, and some development actors' understanding of the term overlap categories (Kaufman, 2011).

2. In the Accra Action for Agenda, Paragraph 28 also states that, (a) We invite CSOs to reflect on how they can apply the Paris principles of aid effectiveness from a CSO perspective. (b) We welcome the CSOs' proposal to encourage them to develop a multi-stakeholder process to improve CSOs' development effectiveness. As part of that process, we will seek to improve coordination of CSOs' efforts with government programmes, (c) enhance CSO accountability for results, and improve information on CSO activities.

(c) We will work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximizes their contributions to development.

3. "Faith-based organizations: a religious congregation (church, mosque, synagogue or temple); an organization, program or project sponsored/hosted by a religious congregation; a non-profit organization founded by a religious congregation or religiously-motivated individuals and board members that clearly states in its name, incorporation or mission statement that it is a religiously-motivated institution; a collaboration of organizations that clearly and explicitly includes organizations from the previously described category" (Perkins, 2009).

4. In 2002, 23 South Korean missionaries were captured and held hostage by members of the Taliban while passing through Shannon County of Afghanistan. Of the 23 hostages captured, two of the men were executed. Later, with negotiations making progress, the remaining hostages were released.

5. Only includes: project expenditures and administrative costs (The KOICA Volunteers Programs, public awareness projects, emergency relief, and KOICA support are excluded). Resources from 1993 to 2000 are based on the "Statistics on the NGO Support Program" of the KOICA NGO Team. Statistics of 2010 and 2011 are from the KOICA website.

6. Resources from 1993 to 2000 are based on "Statistics on the NGO Support Program" of the KOICA NGO Team. The statistics for 2010 and 2011 are from the KOICA website. The figures for countries and projects are from the KOICA website.

7. This observation has been confirmed during interviews on October 31 and November 1, 2011, with KOICA Vice President, Young-Hee Han, KOICA Public-Private Partnership Office Team Leader, Song Il-Byung, and former Public-Private Partnership Office Team Leader, Hyeo Na. We would like to acknowledge the contributions of the following individuals and organizations: KOICA, KOICA NGO Team, and the Korean government's role in supporting international development.

8. "Accountability is the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority and are held responsible for their actions" (Edwards and Hulme, 1990).

"NGO advocacy is speaking out for policy change and action that will address the root causes of problems confronted in development and relief work, and not simply speaking out to alert people of a problem in order to raise funds to support operational work" (Kapoor, 2001).

Washington, D.C. is not only the national capital of the United States, but it is also an international arena in which world political issues are substantially dealt with. Immigrants in the United States represent influence in world politics, exerting their leverage on policy makers in Washington, D.C. The Korean-American Comfort Women Movement in 2007 and the Japanese-American Redress Movement from 1970 to 1992 share common ground in terms of their norms and strategies for success. This article conducts comparative analysis on the two grassroots movements based on Resource Mobilization Theory, and suggests their realistic implications to political dynamics in Washington, D.C.

Keywords: Washington, D.C., Grassroots Politics, Immigrants Group, Resource Mobilization Theory, Comfort Women Movement, Redress Movement

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the context of foreign policy and international relations, Washington, D.C., is in a league of its own. Its total population of roughly 600,000 and total area of 68.5 square miles may not qualify it as a global city under Sassen (2002)'s definition, but not even New York City is comparable to the scale and magnitude of impact Washington plays internationally. It is for this reason that officials from Japan, for instance, intentionally make regular round trips between Narita and Dulles for official meetings with Capitol Hill and administration personnel, that lasts only one or two days at any one time. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak spent nearly a full week in Washington during his official visit, an indication that world leaders recognize the dividends one reaps by being in this town physically. The ongoing economic recession, the epicenter of which was Wall Street, has raised questions as to whether the United States is slipping from its status as the preeminent political and economic power in the world; nevertheless, it will remain at least one of the most influential players, with Washington remaining in its unique prominence.

U.S. foreign policy is not confined to high level diplomatic meetings in Washington, D.C. Although the revolving door relationship inherent to this town between lobbyists and elected politicians often involve domestic agenda, many lobbyists also represent international business and government clients as well. In this relatively less-public forum played by occupants of K Street offices, influential players seek to shape and influence U.S. foreign policy relevant to their areas of interest. An extreme example of this practice is in 1998, when then-Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui hired Cassidy and Associates to pressure the U.S. State Department into reconsidering its initial rejection of a visa request by Lee to travel to Cornell University, his alma mater. Lee's success in playing the K Street game had immediate geopolitical implications. China responded to Washington's U-turn over Lee's visa by launching missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, which ultimately lead to the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis (Sheng 2001, 24-28; Ross 2000).

Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy evolves not only within public official meetings and private lobbyists' interactions. Bottom-up, grassroots movements also have the potential to influence how Washington gets involved in international topics. This article discusses two successful examples of this category: namely the Korean-American Comfort Women Movement in 2007 and the Japanese-American Redress Movement from 1970 to 1992. In presenting the two grassroots movements, the paper serves to examine dynamics of immigrant groups' mobilization in Washington, D.C., and hopes to contribute towards a more holistic understanding of the underlying dynamic forces that influence and shape this city.

1. The Cases to be Studied

"Comfort women" is a euphemistic term for Asian women forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army. While the most prominent stories come from the Korean Peninsula and China, Japan has victimized women elsewhere in Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, following its start of a full-scale war in the region in 1937 that eventually escalated into World War II's Pacific Theater in 1941. The full extent of the victimization of these women is difficult to measure; in fact, the issue did not come into the public spotlight even in South Korea until August 1991, when Kim Hak-Sun went public with her story as a comfort woman (Seitz and Oh 2001, 16). Inspired by Kim's courage, former comfort women and civil activists have held "Wednesday Protests" in front of the Japanese Embassy building in Seoul every week since January 8, 1992. Their voices demanding that Tokyo apologize and make appropriate compensations have fell largely on deaf ears for years. However, mobilization of Korean-Americans in the United States to pass a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives criticizing the Japanese government on the issue awakened Tokyo in July 2007, forcing it to engage in unsuccessful ad hoc measures such as buying a full-page Washington Post ad that condemned the Comfort Women Movement, as explained in the later section.

However, this is not the only example of grassroots movements influencing international affairs. Twenty years ago, Japanese-Americans succeeded in having the U.S. government apologize for its detainment of 120,000 Japanese-Americans living in the United States mainland into ten concentration camps, which were euphemistically called "relocation centers." Following the shocking attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan in 1941, Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 due to suspicions that Japanese-Americans had been collaborating with their ancestral homeland in the war and hence needed to be locked up in prison camps. While this tragedy remained a taboo among Japanese-Americans for decades, as in the comfort women situation in South Korea, a grassroots movement seeking to redress the issue began in the 1970s. It culminated in 1992 when the U.S. government apologized for the mass lockdowns and paid $20,000 for each of the surviving victims as compensation (Niiya 2001, 120-125; McPhee 2006, 13-16; Daniels et al. 1986, 3-6).

There is a two-decade time lag between these two movements. However, the two movements share several common characteristics for analytical interests. First, both cases are related to compensation issues for World War II victims. Second, the two movements define a specific government as responsible for the victims' plight and sought justice. In other words, both of these mobilizations were bottom-up actions. Third, both movements employed the U.S. legislative system to achieve their goals. Fourth, they are grassroots movements in the sense that respective Foreign Ministries did not mobilize them. Lastly, both